Seite - 26 - in Cyborg Mind - What Brain–Computer and Mind–Cyberspace Interfaces Mean for Cyberneuroethics

26 • Cyborg Mind as though it was, or should be, unaccompanied by feelings. If some persons seriously believe something to be wrong, then strong feelings will generally accompany that belief. Emotional reactions may be appropriate or they may be inappropriate, and to decide which ‘[w]e must spell out the message of the emotions and see what they are trying to tell us’.1 However, a spontaneous reaction can also be exploited for many dif- ferent purposes, including its ‘entertainment value’. As already noted, this already happened in modern science fiction treatments, which may then influence the general public, to varying degrees, towards their perception of new technology. But media commentators such as Adam Keiper regret that novels and films on neuronal interfaces do not always represent scientific reality. He explains that ‘public understanding of this research is shaped by sensationalis- tic and misleading coverage in the press; it is colored by decades of fantastical science fiction portrayals; and it is distorted by the utopian hopes of a small but vocal band of enthusiasts who desire to eliminate the boundaries between brains and machines’. However, Keiper also recognises that this is not something new.2 For example, many scientists may now regret the influence of English novelist Mary Shelley’s (1797–1851) classic novel Frankenstein, published in 1818, about the existential trauma of a living monster created from the body parts of the deceased. However, the Frankenstein story may still have a place in the context of debate about changes to humanity since it seeks to explore, express and represent some of the revulsion, anxieties and emotions relating to crossing biological boundaries. It also portrays the frightening prospects of what can go wrong when scientists, working in secret and without any ethical oversight, end up creating new beings that can only be considered as ‘monsters’. The basis of the emotional reaction relating to some neuronal interfaces may similarly arise from the position that different biological and electronic elements should be kept apart, since mixed entities do not fit neatly into existing categories. From this perspective, human-computer cyborgs that cannot be clearly put into a specific category are usually considered as mon- strous not merely because of their hideousness (which is merely an aesthetic expression of a lack of wholeness), but because they are seen as bringing disorder to an ordered setting. With respect to neuronal interfaces, an important distinction may also be related to the different types of interfaces used. Indeed, some may not be seen to be as threatening as others to the identity or species status of the resulting being. Interestingly, it may be the external appearance of the neuronal interfaces that creates the most aversion amongst the general public in contrast to any This open access edition has been made available under a CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.