Seite - 73 - in Cyborg Mind - What Brain–Computer and Mind–Cyberspace Interfaces Mean for Cyberneuroethics

Neuronal Interface Systems • 73 surrogate body is in fact their own and acting accordingly.115 In this regard, Andy Clark explains that: Our sense of bodily presence is always constructed on the basis of the brain’s ongoing registration of correlations. If the correlations are reliable, persistent, and supported by a robust, reliable causal chain, then the body image that is constructed on that basis is well grounded. It is well grounded regardless of whether the intervening circuitry is wholly biological or includes nonbiological components.116 This means, for instance, that if a person can feel and directly control an object with his or her hand, which he or she considers to be part of his or her body, then feeling and directly controlling the same object through an advanced telemanipulator may encourage this individual to similarly con- sider the device as being part of his or her body. This would be true even if the telemanipulator was activated at a considerable distance from the person. However, what this would then mean for the ‘sense of presence’ of the indi- vidual still needs to be evaluated.117 Similarly, the British Philosopher Jonathan Glover indicates that: “[I]f signals could be sent from my nervous system to receptors in physical objects detached from my body, so that I could move those objects in the same direct way I can move my arms, it might be less clear that I stop where my body ends. These doubts would be even stronger if sensory signals could be sent back, enabling me to “feel” things happening in the detached objects. We might then say that I extend beyond my body, or else we might treat these objects as free-floating parts of my body.”118 There is also interest in using neuroimaging, such as EEG, to detect aware- ness in patients who are totally ‘locked-in’. To do this, patients are invited to imagine moving parts of their bodies, enabling brain signals to be recorded, indicating that they are self-aware.119 For example, it has been shown through neuroimaging that patients who were previously thought to be in a perma- nent vegetative state could demonstrate a sufficient level of brain function to express certain wishes. This resulted in serious discussions on whether treat- ment protocols for such patients should be revised to take account of their own decisions.120 In this regard, real-time recordings would also be particu- larly important for engaging patients with impaired consciousness in certain activities.121 However, therapeutic uses of neuronal interfaces are still usually confined to clinical research in which noninvasive techniques are the most common.122 Yet the considerable success of these trials has generated a lot of media and public interest.123 This open access edition has been made available under a CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.