Seite - 159 - in Cyborg Mind - What Brain–Computer and Mind–Cyberspace Interfaces Mean for Cyberneuroethics

Cyberneuroethics • 159 inside us, they become part of us, turning us into our own products and blur- ring the lines we once drew between subjects and object, agent and effect’.243 This, in a way, also reflects the philosophical idea of ‘mind extension’ which suggests that the mind cannot simply be seen as something that is resident in the brain since it can, in various ways, spread out instead into its surroundings, merging with other things, places and other minds. As such, Andy Clark, who is one of the leading philosophers of mind extension, indicates that: New waves of almost invisible, user-sensitive, semi-intelligent, knowledge- based electronics and software are perfectly posed to merge seamlessly with individual biological brains. In so doing they will ultimately blur the boundary between the user and her knowledge-rich, responsive, unconsciously operat- ing electronic environments. More and more parts of our worlds will come to share the moral and psychological status of parts of our brains.244 The Canadian computer scientist and futurologist Hans Moravec even indicates that it may, in the future, be possible to connect a human brain to a computer in such a way that ‘in time, as your original brain faded away with age, the computer would smoothly assume the lost functions. Ultimately your brain would die, and your mind would find itself entirely in the com- puter’.245 This means that when the human body eventually decays, this brain–computer information exchange may be able to preserve the essence of self-consciousness, personal histories and creative abilities.246 Another interesting area of research is computer-based brain simulation, whereby neurobiological systems are used as models to create a computer imitation of the entire brain, making it possible for a new digital mind to emerge. As the U.K.-based bioethicists Sarah Chan and John Harris note: ‘The question is whether a computer that simulates the whole human brain to a sufficiently realistic degree would become, in some sense, a human mind or indeed any other sort of mind.’247 But could a nonbiological entity lacking any of the human physical attri- butes ever be considered a ‘human’ being? Kurzweil believes that any new human-like artificial intelligences that could evolve through such a process will be ‘human even if they are not biological’248 and suggests that the term ‘human-machine intelligence’ should be used to highlight this fact. In this way, Kurzweil’s main argument for the humanity of machine intelligence is that it has evolved very slowly from beings who are undoubtedly human.249 There would then be ‘a world that is still human but that transcends our bio- logical roots’ in which ‘there will be no distinction . . . between human and machine or between physical and virtual reality’.250 Yet, as already indicated, no definition of what is human exists and it is therefore difficult to set any limits to what is human. This open access edition has been made available under a CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.