Seite - 166 - in Cyborg Mind - What Brain–Computer and Mind–Cyberspace Interfaces Mean for Cyberneuroethics

166 • Cyborg Mind It is interesting that the posthumanists use a language of tolerance and open-mindedness. But Hayles argues that the transition from human to post- human may not be consistent with these liberal principles.298 The philosophy of autonomy, freedom and rights relies on the reality that the individual is a distinct being with clear and lasting boundaries separating one individual from another, particularly in the case of a biological human with a distinct identity. But in a posthuman future, it may be necessary for these borders to become moveable and immaterial. In fact, for posthumanists, technologi- cal change requires that all boundaries be easily altered.299 For example, in a posthuman existence, there is no fixed boundary between a bodily brain existence and any other kind of existence that can be supported by a com- puter. There is also no separation between humans and their environment, between the entity that thinks and the entity that is being thought about, and no inherent division between mind and matter.300 A biological brain is not seen as necessary and configurations of information are more important to the state of being.301 But how can this moveable network of information maintain an indi- vidual’s identity? What exactly remains of an individual when these networks are constantly changing and developing? Indeed, many new identities would be created if the entire minds of human beings are copied on to a computer. Will they then merge into a single conscious being? Within this arrangement, the posthuman is not simply an extremely enhanced autonomous being, since the very existence of posthumanity may require destroying the actual basis of autonomy, individuality and personal freedom, which determines liberal, humanistic agency.302 Ethical Consequences for Human Persons In this context, it is very important to seek to determine what the ethical implications of such profound changes may be. Many of the posthumanist values are similar to those found in the already mentioned second-century religious movement of Gnosticism, where followers rejected the material world to only concentrate on what was spiritual. But St Irenaeus, a second-century Christian bishop of Lyon (central France), argued that the Gnostic position of disdaining the body, including the brain, led to two conflicting ethical positions. The first was that a moral stance of liberty to physical experiences could develop because a human body was no longer considered as really belonging to a person. Thus, if it was no longer seen as being an important part of a person, then it did not really matter what a person did with it. The second position was one in which extreme austerity could be demonstrated towards the body. A person would then be able to express or reveal the insignificance of the body by neglecting it. This open access edition has been made available under a CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.