Seite - 176 - in Cyborg Mind - What Brain–Computer and Mind–Cyberspace Interfaces Mean for Cyberneuroethics

176 • Cyborg Mind vision, but many can see the appeal of being able to ‘escape’ reality and live within such a system. Nevertheless, the American computer game developer Jason Rohrer is sceptical about the immortality aim suggested by posthumanism. Because of this, he created in 2007 the virtual game Immortality, where players can choose immortality and then build structures with blocks. If they grow bored, however, they can quit voluntarily by choosing death. Rohrer openly admits that the game plays with the ‘faith’ espoused by posthumanism and acts as a thought experiment, while asking questions about the aim and meaning of immortality. He notes: ‘We generally assume that immortality is good, just as we assume that death is bad. Of course, universal immortality (all six billion of us) would be physically impractical. But what about individual immortal- ity? What about for you? If you could become immortal, would you?’348 The game initiated much online debate including on the Internet site The Escapist in 2008, where it was released. Interestingly, many commentators were not so negative about the prospect of immortality and the many options that might be available to those with eternal youth. In fact, some who played the game believed that it strongly supported the case for choosing immortal- ity. But most commentators found that the game failed to fully illustrate the many options that may be available to those with eternal youth, which was the declared preference of a considerable majority. Among the thirty-eight posts in which a position on immortality was taken, twenty-eight favoured it.349 Whether or not mind uploading or posthumanist immortality is a realistic possibility, such aspirations did appear to have been important to the online virtual world Second Life. Its American creator, Philip Rosedale, suggested that to be limited by the confines of the human skeleton is not something to be embraced350 and that there was also value in trying to figure out how to escape death.351 This resonates with his willingness to believe that some posthumanist dreams might be realised. Indeed, he appears to accept, with reservations, the basic premise of mind uploading, claiming that: ‘There’s a reasonable argument that we’ll be able to leave our bodies behind by upload- ing into virtual reality.’352 Body-Mind Questions in Computers Given the different perspectives and interpretations relating to personal iden- tity, the very possibility that some identities may change if their material supports were modified should also be considered. Bostrom indicates in this regard that: ‘Substrate is morally irrelevant. Whether somebody is imple- mented on silicon or biological tissue, if it does not affect functionality or consciousness, is of no moral significance. Carbon-chauvinism is objection- able on the same grounds as racism.’353 This open access edition has been made available under a CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.