Seite - 122 - in The Complete Plato

SOCRATES: We shall know better, my good friend, in a little while. The point which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods. EUTHYPHRO: I do not understand your meaning, Socrates. SOCRATES: I will endeavour to explain: we, speak of carrying and we speak of being carried, of leading and being led, seeing and being seen. You know that in all such cases there is a difference, and you know also in what the difference lies? EUTHYPHRO: I think that I understand. SOCRATES: And is not that which is beloved distinct from that which loves? EUTHYPHRO: Certainly. SOCRATES: Well; and now tell me, is that which is carried in this state of carrying because it is carried, or for some other reason? EUTHYPHRO: No; that is the reason. SOCRATES: And the same is true of what is led and of what is seen? EUTHYPHRO: True. SOCRATES: And a thing is not seen because it is visible, but conversely, visible because it is seen; nor is a thing led because it is in the state of being led, or carried because it is in the state of being carried, but the converse of this. And now I think, Euthyphro, that my meaning will be intelligible; and my meaning is, that any state of action or passion implies previous action or passion. It does not become because it is becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes; neither does it suffer because it is in a state of suffering, but it is in a state of suffering because it suffers. Do you not agree? EUTHYPHRO: Yes. SOCRATES: Is not that which is loved in some state either of becoming or suffering? EUTHYPHRO: Yes. SOCRATES: And the same holds as in the previous instances; the state of being loved follows the act of being loved, and not the act the state. EUTHYPHRO: Certainly. SOCRATES: And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro: is not piety, according to your definition, loved by all the gods? 122