Seite - 473 - in The Complete Plato

have existed before she came into the body, because to her belongs the essence of which the very name implies existence. Having, as I am convinced, rightly accepted this conclusion, and on sufficient grounds, I must, as I suppose, cease to argue or allow others to argue that the soul is a harmony. Let me put the matter, Simmias, he said, in another point of view: Do you imagine that a harmony or any other composition can be in a state other than that of the elements, out of which it is compounded? Certainly not. Or do or suffer anything other than they do or suffer? He agreed. Then a harmony does not, properly speaking, lead the parts or elements which make up the harmony, but only follows them. He assented. For harmony cannot possibly have any motion, or sound, or other quality which is opposed to its parts. That would be impossible, he replied. And does not the nature of every harmony depend upon the manner in which the elements are harmonized? I do not understand you, he said. I mean to say that a harmony admits of degrees, and is more of a harmony, and more completely a harmony, when more truly and fully harmonized, to any extent which is possible; and less of a harmony, and less completely a harmony, when less truly and fully harmonized. True. But does the soul admit of degrees? or is one soul in the very least degree more or less, or more or less completely, a soul than another? Not in the least. Yet surely of two souls, one is said to have intelligence and virtue, and to be good, and the other to have folly and vice, and to be an evil soul: and this is said truly? Yes, truly. But what will those who maintain the soul to be a harmony say of this presence of virtue and vice in the soul?—will they say that here is another harmony, and another discord, and that the virtuous soul is harmonized, and 473