Seite - 663 - in The Complete Plato

which all other things are compounded there could be no definition, because each of them when taken by itself is uncompounded; nor can one rightly attribute to them the words ‘being’ or ‘this,’ because they are alien and inappropriate words, and for this reason the letters or elements were indefinable and unknown? THEAETETUS: I remember. SOCRATES: And is not this also the reason why they are simple and indivisible? I can see no other. THEAETETUS: No other reason can be given. SOCRATES: Then is not the syllable in the same case as the elements or letters, if it has no parts and is one form? THEAETETUS: To be sure. SOCRATES: If, then, a syllable is a whole, and has many parts or letters, the letters as well as the syllable must be intelligible and expressible, since all the parts are acknowledged to be the same as the whole? THEAETETUS: True. SOCRATES: But if it be one and indivisible, then the syllables and the letters are alike undefined and unknown, and for the same reason? THEAETETUS: I cannot deny that. SOCRATES: We cannot, therefore, agree in the opinion of him who says that the syllable can be known and expressed, but not the letters. THEAETETUS: Certainly not; if we may trust the argument. SOCRATES: Well, but will you not be equally inclined to disagree with him, when you remember your own experience in learning to read? THEAETETUS: What experience? SOCRATES: Why, that in learning you were kept trying to distinguish the separate letters both by the eye and by the ear, in order that, when you heard them spoken or saw them written, you might not be confused by their position. THEAETETUS: Very true. SOCRATES: And is the education of the harp-player complete unless he can tell what string answers to a particular note; the notes, as every one would allow, are the elements or letters of music? THEAETETUS: Exactly. 663