Seite - 668 - in The Complete Plato

Theodorus, or from some outer barbarian? THEAETETUS: How could it? SOCRATES: Or if I had further conceived of you, not only as having nose and eyes, but as having a snub nose and prominent eyes, should I have any more notion of you than of myself and others who resemble me? THEAETETUS: Certainly not. SOCRATES: Surely I can have no conception of Theaetetus until your snub- nosedness has left an impression on my mind different from the snub- nosedness of all others whom I have ever seen, and until your other peculiarities have a like distinctness; and so when I meet you to-morrow the right opinion will be re-called? THEAETETUS: Most true. SOCRATES: Then right opinion implies the perception of differences? THEAETETUS: Clearly. SOCRATES: What, then, shall we say of adding reason or explanation to right opinion? If the meaning is, that we should form an opinion of the way in which something differs from another thing, the proposal is ridiculous. THEAETETUS: How so? SOCRATES: We are supposed to acquire a right opinion of the differences which distinguish one thing from another when we have already a right opinion of them, and so we go round and round:—the revolution of the scytal, or pestle, or any other rotatory machine, in the same circles, is as nothing compared with such a requirement; and we may be truly described as the blind directing the blind; for to add those things which we already have, in order that we may learn what we already think, is like a soul utterly benighted. THEAETETUS: Tell me; what were you going to say just now, when you asked the question? SOCRATES: If, my boy, the argument, in speaking of adding the definition, had used the word to ‘know,’ and not merely ‘have an opinion’ of the difference, this which is the most promising of all the definitions of knowledge would have come to a pretty end, for to know is surely to acquire knowledge. THEAETETUS: True. SOCRATES: And so, when the question is asked, What is knowledge? this fair argument will answer ‘Right opinion with knowledge,’—knowledge, that 668