Seite - 678 - in The Complete Plato

meaning? Yes, said Socrates, I quite see your meaning. And will not knowledge—I mean absolute knowledge—answer to absolute truth? Certainly. And each kind of absolute knowledge will answer to each kind of absolute being? Yes. But the knowledge which we have, will answer to the truth which we have; and again, each kind of knowledge which we have, will be a knowledge of each kind of being which we have? Certainly. But the ideas themselves, as you admit, we have not, and cannot have? No, we cannot. And the absolute natures or kinds are known severally by the absolute idea of knowledge? Yes. And we have not got the idea of knowledge? No. Then none of the ideas are known to us, because we have no share in absolute knowledge? I suppose not. Then the nature of the beautiful in itself, and of the good in itself, and all other ideas which we suppose to exist absolutely, are unknown to us? It would seem so. I think that there is a stranger consequence still. What is it? Would you, or would you not say, that absolute knowledge, if there is such a thing, must be a far more exact knowledge than our knowledge; and the same of beauty and of the rest? Yes. And if there be such a thing as participation in absolute knowledge, no one 678