Seite - 691 - in The Complete Plato

But can all this be true about the one? I think not. 1.b. Suppose, now, that we return once more to the original hypothesis; let us see whether, on a further review, any new aspect of the question appears. I shall be very happy to do so. We say that we have to work out together all the consequences, whatever they may be, which follow, if the one is? Yes. Then we will begin at the beginning:—If one is, can one be, and not partake of being? Impossible. Then the one will have being, but its being will not be the same with the one; for if the same, it would not be the being of the one; nor would the one have participated in being, for the proposition that one is would have been identical with the proposition that one is one; but our hypothesis is not if one is one, what will follow, but if one is:—am I not right? Quite right. We mean to say, that being has not the same significance as one? Of course. And when we put them together shortly, and say ‘One is,’ that is equivalent to saying, ‘partakes of being’? Quite true. Once more then let us ask, if one is what will follow. Does not this hypothesis necessarily imply that one is of such a nature as to have parts? How so? In this way:—If being is predicated of the one, if the one is, and one of being, if being is one; and if being and one are not the same; and since the one, which we have assumed, is, must not the whole, if it is one, itself be, and have for its parts, one and being? Certainly. And is each of these parts—one and being—to be simply called a part, or must the word ‘part’ be relative to the word ‘whole’? The latter. 691