Seite - 699 - in The Complete Plato

Of course. Then will the same ever be in the other, or the other in the same? They will not. If then the other is never in the same, there is nothing in which the other is during any space of time; for during that space of time, however small, the other would be in the same. Is not that true? Yes. And since the other is never in the same, it can never be in anything that is. True. Then the other will never be either in the not-one, or in the one? Certainly not. Then not by reason of otherness is the one other than the not-one, or the not-one other than the one. No. Nor by reason of themselves will they be other than one another, if not partaking of the other. How can they be? But if they are not other, either by reason of themselves or of the other, will they not altogether escape being other than one another? They will. Again, the not-one cannot partake of the one; otherwise it would not have been not-one, but would have been in some way one. True. Nor can the not-one be number; for having number, it would not have been not-one at all. It would not. Again, is the not-one part of the one; or rather, would it not in that case partake of the one? It would. If then, in every point of view, the one and the not-one are distinct, then neither is the one part or whole of the not-one, nor is the not-one part or whole of the one? 699