Seite - 721 - in The Complete Plato

But for that which partakes of nothing to partake of two things was held by us to be impossible? Impossible. Then the others are neither like nor unlike nor both, for if they were like or unlike they would partake of one of those two natures, which would be one thing, and if they were both they would partake of opposites which would be two things, and this has been shown to be impossible. True. Therefore they are neither the same, nor other, nor in motion, nor at rest, nor in a state of becoming, nor of being destroyed, nor greater, nor less, nor equal, nor have they experienced anything else of the sort; for, if they are capable of experiencing any such affection, they will participate in one and two and three, and odd and even, and in these, as has been proved, they do not participate, seeing that they are altogether and in every way devoid of the one. Very true. Therefore if one is, the one is all things, and also nothing, both in relation to itself and to other things. Certainly. 2.a. Well, and ought we not to consider next what will be the consequence if the one is not? Yes; we ought. What is the meaning of the hypothesis—If the one is not; is there any difference between this and the hypothesis—If the not one is not? There is a difference, certainly. Is there a difference only, or rather are not the two expressions—if the one is not, and if the not one is not, entirely opposed? They are entirely opposed. And suppose a person to say:—If greatness is not, if smallness is not, or anything of that sort, does he not mean, whenever he uses such an expression, that ‘what is not’ is other than other things? To be sure. And so when he says ‘If one is not’ he clearly means, that what ‘is not’ is other than all others; we know what he means—do we not? Yes, we do. 721