Seite - 730 - in The Complete Plato

True. And it would seem that number can be predicated of them if each of them appears to be one, though it is really many? It can. And there will seem to be odd and even among them, which will also have no reality, if one is not? Yes. And there will appear to be a least among them; and even this will seem large and manifold in comparison with the many small fractions which are contained in it? Certainly. And each particle will be imagined to be equal to the many and little; for it could not have appeared to pass from the greater to the less without having appeared to arrive at the middle; and thus would arise the appearance of equality. Yes. And having neither beginning, middle, nor end, each separate particle yet appears to have a limit in relation to itself and other. How so? Because, when a person conceives of any one of these as such, prior to the beginning another beginning appears, and there is another end, remaining after the end, and in the middle truer middles within but smaller, because no unity can be conceived of any of them, since the one is not. Very true. And so all being, whatever we think of, must be broken up into fractions, for a particle will have to be conceived of without unity? Certainly. And such being when seen indistinctly and at a distance, appears to be one; but when seen near and with keen intellect, every single thing appears to be infinite, since it is deprived of the one, which is not? Nothing more certain. Then each of the others must appear to be infinite and finite, and one and many, if others than the one exist and not the one. They must. 730