Seite - 777 - in The Complete Plato

are? THEAETETUS: I should. STRANGER: And when you admit that both or either of them are, do you mean to say that both or either of them are in motion? THEAETETUS: Certainly not. STRANGER: Or do you wish to imply that they are both at rest, when you say that they are? THEAETETUS: Of course not. STRANGER: Then you conceive of being as some third and distinct nature, under which rest and motion are alike included; and, observing that they both participate in being, you declare that they are. THEAETETUS: Truly we seem to have an intimation that being is some third thing, when we say that rest and motion are. STRANGER: Then being is not the combination of rest and motion, but something different from them. THEAETETUS: So it would appear. STRANGER: Being, then, according to its own nature, is neither in motion nor at rest. THEAETETUS: That is very much the truth. STRANGER: Where, then, is a man to look for help who would have any clear or fixed notion of being in his mind? THEAETETUS: Where, indeed? STRANGER: I scarcely think that he can look anywhere; for that which is not in motion must be at rest, and again, that which is not at rest must be in motion; but being is placed outside of both these classes. Is this possible? THEAETETUS: Utterly impossible. STRANGER: Here, then, is another thing which we ought to bear in mind. THEAETETUS: What? STRANGER: When we were asked to what we were to assign the appellation of not-being, we were in the greatest difficulty:—do you remember? THEAETETUS: To be sure. STRANGER: And are we not now in as great a difficulty about being? 777