Seite - 800 - in The Complete Plato

THEAETETUS: Yes. STRANGER: Let this, then, be named the art of mimicry, and this the province assigned to it; as for the other division, we are weary and will give that up, leaving to some one else the duty of making the class and giving it a suitable name. THEAETETUS: Let us do as you say—assign a sphere to the one and leave the other. STRANGER: There is a further distinction, Theaetetus, which is worthy of our consideration, and for a reason which I will tell you. THEAETETUS: Let me hear. STRANGER: There are some who imitate, knowing what they imitate, and some who do not know. And what line of distinction can there possibly be greater than that which divides ignorance from knowledge? THEAETETUS: There can be no greater. STRANGER: Was not the sort of imitation of which we spoke just now the imitation of those who know? For he who would imitate you would surely know you and your figure? THEAETETUS: Naturally. STRANGER: And what would you say of the figure or form of justice or of virtue in general? Are we not well aware that many, having no knowledge of either, but only a sort of opinion, do their best to show that this opinion is really entertained by them, by expressing it, as far as they can, in word and deed? THEAETETUS: Yes, that is very common. STRANGER: And do they always fail in their attempt to be thought just, when they are not? Or is not the very opposite true? THEAETETUS: The very opposite. STRANGER: Such a one, then, should be described as an imitator—to be distinguished from the other, as he who is ignorant is distinguished from him who knows? THEAETETUS: True. STRANGER: Can we find a suitable name for each of them? This is clearly not an easy task; for among the ancients there was some confusion of ideas, which prevented them from attempting to divide genera into species; wherefore there is no great abundance of names. Yet, for the sake of 800