Seite - 915 - in The Complete Plato

classes—one having power and might; and the other the reverse. PROTARCHUS: Certainly. SOCRATES: Let this, then, be the principle of division; those of them who are weak and unable to revenge themselves, when they are laughed at, may be truly called ridiculous, but those who can defend themselves may be more truly described as strong and formidable; for ignorance in the powerul is hateful and horrible, because hurtful to others both in reality and in fiction, but powerless ignorance may be reckoned, and in truth is, ridiculous. PROTARCHUS: That is very true, but I do not as yet see where is the admixture of pleasures and pains. SOCRATES: Well, then, let us examine the nature of envy. PROTARCHUS: Proceed. SOCRATES: Is not envy an unrighteous pleasure, and also an unrighteous pain? PROTARCHUS: Most true. SOCRATES: There is nothing envious or wrong in rejoicing at the misfortunes of enemies? PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. SOCRATES: But to feel joy instead of sorrow at the sight of our friends’ misfortunes—is not that wrong? PROTARCHUS: Undoubtedly. SOCRATES: Did we not say that ignorance was always an evil? PROTARCHUS: True. SOCRATES: And the three kinds of vain conceit in our friends which we enumerated—the vain conceit of beauty, of wisdom, and of wealth, are ridiculous if they are weak, and detestable when they are powerful: May we not say, as I was saying before, that our friends who are in this state of mind, when harmless to others, are simply ridiculous? PROTARCHUS: They are ridiculous. SOCRATES: And do we not acknowledge this ignorance of theirs to be a misfortune? PROTARCHUS: Certainly. SOCRATES: And do we feel pain or pleasure in laughing at it? 915